Introduction by Epstein, Lee
Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 
Volume 54 
2017 
Introduction 
Lee Epstein 
Ethan A.H. Shepley Distinguished University Professor at Washington University in St. Louis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lee Epstein, Introduction, 54 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 001 (2017), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/7 
This Introduction is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Journal of Law & Policy by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
Washington University 
Journal of Law & Policy  
Judicial Behavior of the Roberts Court 
Introduction 
Lee Epstein* 
We’ve titled this symposium “The Judicial Behavior of the 
Roberts Court.” But perhaps we should have called it “The Judicial 
Behavior of the Roberts Courts (Plural)”1 Or simply the “Judicial 
Behavior of the U.S. Supreme Court.” These alternatives are 
distinctions with differences; they challenge us to consider whether 
the Roberts Court is uniform, unique, or both.  
Taking on this challenge is a talented group of (mostly) social 
scientists.2 But please: don’t stop reading. Sure, I understand that 
many (most?) of you tend to think of us social scientists as 
 
 * Ethan A.H. Shepley Distinguished University Professor at Washington University in 
St. Louis. I thank the National Science Foundation, Washington University School of Law, and 
the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation for supporting my research on judicial behavior. 
 1.  As Merrill notes,  
The Supreme Court is implicitly assumed to have a certain unity of character under 
each Chief Justice. Hence, we refer to the “Marshall Court,” the “Warren Court,” and 
the “Rehnquist Court.” A closer look at history reveals that this assumption of a 
natural Court defined by the tenure of each Chief Justice is often misleading. The 
Marshall Court had a different character late in its life than it did in its early years. 
He identifies two different Rehnquist Courts (October 1986 to July 1994; October 1994 
forward). Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court, 47 St. Louis U. L.J. 
569, 569-570 (2003). 
 2.  Three of the contributors are J.D./Ph.Ds (Feldman, Hazelton, Owens); and three are 
J.D.s (Posner, Daneshvar, and Smith). 
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simpletons who reduce vast swaths of law to little more than 
dichotomies: the court affirmed or reversed, the judge voted in the 
liberal or conservative direction, the business party won or lost, and 
on and on.3 And even worse: we’re obfuscating simpletons what with 
our tendency to write in code (“measures,” “regressions,” “p-
values”). 
I ask you to give us a chance because the essays in this 
symposium are neither foolish nor unreadable. Many move beyond 
simple dichotomies (and those that don’t are far more interesting than 
you might expect); and all accept Earl Warren’s “theory” about how 
to persuade a skeptical audience: keep it “short,” “readable,” and 
“non-rhetorical.”4 (In his memoir, Warren added “nontechnical”;5 the 
essays to follow are that too.)  
If you’re still not convinced, please keep reading; perchance 
squibs of our authors’ takes on the uniformity and distinctiveness of 
the Roberts Court era will persuade you. If you’re already convinced, 
head directly to the essays. The synopses below are no substitute for 
the real things.  
I. A ROBERTS COURT? 
Is there a Roberts Court? The answer isn’t obvious. On the one 
hand, with the appointment of Neil Gorsuch, the era is starting its 
sixth chapter (see Figure 1)—with more likely.6 For this reason 
 
 3.  I’ve made this observation in another context. Lee Epstein, “Exemplary Legal 
Writing 2016: Books,” in Green Bag Almanac & Reader (2017, forthcoming), 
http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/GreenBagBooks2017.pdf  
 4.  Warren was referring to the school segregation cases. See Memo to the Members of 
the Court, May 7, 1954. See Brown v. Board at Fifty: “With an Even Hand,” LIB. OF CONG., 
https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-brown.html. Warren also wrote that the Brown et al. 
opinions should be “unemotional” and “non-accusatory.” The essays follow this rule too. 
 5.  Earl Warren, The Memoirs of Chief Justice Earl Warren (1977), at 3.  
 6.  Political scientists refer to each chapter as a “natural court,” which is a period of 
stability in the Court’s membership. For an overview, see the U.S. SUPREME COURT 
DATABASE, http://supremecourtdatabase.org/documentation.php?var=naturalCourt. For 
approaches to delineating natural courts, see, for example, Edward V. Heck, Justice Brennan 
and the Heyday of Warren Court Liberalism, 20 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW 841, 842–43 
(1980) and Changing Voting Patterns in the Burger Court: The Impact of Personnel Change, 
17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1021, 1038 (1980); Harold J. Spaeth & Michael F. Altfeld, Measuring 
Power on the Supreme Court: An Alternative to the Power Index, 26 JURIMETRICS 48, 55 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/7
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alone, The Six Roberts Courts seems a better descriptor; and on that 
the justices probably would agree. They are fond of saying that “it’s a 
different” Court with each change in membership.7 
Figure 1. Justices aligned from left to right, broken down by natural 
courts, 2005–2015 terms 
 
Notes: 
1. A natural court is a period of stability in the Court’s membership. See 
note 6. 
2. Ideology is the mean of the Martin & Quinn score for the 2005-2015 
terms.8 Gorsuch’s score is an estimate based on Lee Epstein, Andrew D. 
Martin, and Kevin Quinn, President-Elect Trump and his Possible Justices, 
 
(1985). 
 7.  Byron White, quoted in Linda Greenhouse, Every Justice Creates a New Seat, N.Y 
TIMES (May 26, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/27/opinion/27greenhouse.html; 
Anthony Kennedy quoted in The Supreme Court: A C-Span Book Featuring the Justices in 
their Own Words, ed. Brian Lamb, et al. 84 (2010) (“When I was trying jury cases . . . if a juror 
had to be replaced because one was ill or something . . . it was a different dynamic . . . It’s the 
same way here. This will be a very different court [with a new justice].”). 
 8.  Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 Political Analysis 134 (2002). 
Scores available at http://mqscores.berkeley.edu/press.php. 
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at: http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/PossibleTrumpJustices.html. 
 
On the other hand, a casual look at Figure 1 suggests the more 
things changed, the more they stayed the same. Sotomayor-for-Souter 
and Kagan-for-Stevens were near even ideological swaps. We predict 
the same of Gorsuch-Scalia. Only the appointment of Alito to replace 
O’Connor at the very start of the Roberts Court seems noticeable. 
Then again, if we believe accounts emphasizing the importance of the 
Court’s center,9 even that change wasn’t so dramatic: the median 
shifted only slightly—from O’Connor to Kennedy. 
And yet our contributors find some truth in the old saw of a “new 
Court” as justices come and go. Shahrzad Daneshvar and Brooke 
Smith,10 for example, identify a similarity between two justices 
whose names are not naturally linked: Scalia and Sotomayor. 
Between the 2009 and 2014 terms, both favored criminal defendants 
at rates higher than their overall voting patterns would let on. 
As it relates to Sotomayor, this finding belies pre-appointment 
speculation that she would be tough on crime because of her 
prosecutorial experience and judicial decisions.11 It turns out that 
Sotomayor votes more often in favor of criminal defendants than any 
justice since Thurgood Marshall left the Court in 1991.12 Why the 
mismatch between Sotomayor’s pre-Court record and her votes on 
the Supreme Court? Research shows that judges with promotion 
 
 9. Reviewed in Andrew D. Martin, Kevin Quinn & Lee Epstein, The Median Justice on 
the U.S. Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1275 (2005). 
 10.  Shahrzad Daneshvar & Brook Clason Smith, Nino & Sonia: The Dark Horse Heroes 
of Criminal Justice on the Roberts Court, 54 WASH. U. J. L. POL’Y 18 (2017). 
 11.  E.g., Catherine Rampell, Sotomayor: Tough on White-Collar Crime, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 9, 2009), https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/09/sotomayor-tough-on-white-
collar-crime/; Jess Bravin & Nathan Koppel, Nominee’s Criminal Rulings Tilt to Right of 
Souter, WALL ST. J. (June 5, 2009), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB124415867263187033; David Lightman & Michael 
Doyle, Sotomayor Hearings Offer Lessons for Future Nominees, MCCLATCHY (July 17, 2009), 
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/07/17/72057/sotomayor-hearings-offer-lessons.html. 
 12.  Calculated from the Supreme Court Database (at: http://supremecourtdatabase.org) 
with decisionType=1 or 7 and issue=1 (criminal procedure). Still, there’s a substantial and 
significant gap between Thurgood Marshall (the fourth most favorable toward defendants’ 
rights since 1946) and Sotomayor (the tenth most favorable): 80% in favor of defendants versus 
68%. Also, Stevens was not far behind Sotomayor at 68%. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/7
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potential—the “auditioners”—may be harsher on defendants out of a 
belief that the public (and so presidents and senators) disfavors 
judges who are soft on crime.13 
More relevant here is Daneshvar and Smith’s finding on Scalia. 
Figure 1 suggests that the switch from Scalia to Gorsuch won’t 
matter much. But Daneshvar and Smith say not so fast. Unless 
Gorsuch shares Scalia’s views on the Fourth Amendment and the 
Confrontation Clause, he may well push the court to the right in these 
areas. 
Matthew E.K. Hall’s essay too gives cause for reconsidering even 
swaps that appear de minims in effect (e.g., Kagan-for-Stevens).14 
Hall’s project is to shift focus from ideology to personality—though 
his is no exercise in hagio- or psychobiography. In effort to explain 
the justices’ choices, he applies a generalized model of personality 
type. That model, called the “Big Five,” emphasizes five traits: 
openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, 
neuroticism (the acronym OCEAN might help you remember them). 
Hall isn’t the first to emphasize the importance of personality. 
Chief Justice Roberts, for one, attributed John Marshall’s success as a 
judicial leader to “the force of his personality. That lack of pretense, 
that openness and general trustworthiness, were very important 
personality traits in Marshall’s success.”15 But Hall is among the first 
to develop these ideas systematically; and assuming he’s got it right, 
then all the comings and goings on the Roberts Court could affect its 
work.  
To illustrate: Hall puts two key players on the current Court—the 
Chief and the “super median” Kennedy16—in the Agreeable category 
because they value harmony and cooperation over individuality. 
According to Hall, that explains why neither dissents at very high 
rates. Their dominant trait of agreeability, along with their dominant 
positions on the Court, may also explain the recent increase in the 
 
 13.  LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF 
FEDERAL JUDGES 369–379 (2013). 
 14. Matthew E.K. Hall, “They’ve Got Personality!”: Goals, Traits, and Behavior on the 
U.S. Supreme Court, 54 WASH. U. J. L. & POL. 98 (2017). 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacobi, Super Medians, 61 STAN. L. REV. 37 (2008). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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fraction of unanimous decisions (more on this below). Were a more 
disagreeable, less cooperative sort to replace Kennedy, we might 
expect the fraction to drop. 
Related is Joseph Smith’s article, which contends that personal 
interactions are relevant to a complete explanation of individual 
behavior. Anyone who has served on a committee will nod their head 
in agreement but testing the importance of group relations is another 
matter. It’s hard to identify direct indicators of (dis)harmony in most 
settings—perhaps especially the Court.17 The justices have long sang 
Kumbayaesque refrains of “admiration,”18 “never . . . a voice raised 
in anger,”19 and “bonding.”20  
 
Smith proves otherwise by focusing not on what the justices say 
but on what they write—specifically the extent to which they name 
and blame in opinions, as in “Justice Stevens is dead wrong to think 
that the right to petition is ‘primarily collective in nature’” (Scalia in 
Heller);21 or “Justice Breyer’s reliance on the average hourly rate for 
all of respondents' attorneys is highly misleading” (Alito in 
Perdue).22 Smith shows, first, that personal attacks in opinions were 
uncommon until the Rehnquist years but are now unexceptional; and 
second, that the offenders are not evenly distributed. Stevens 
regularly went after Scalia and Thomas; and Scalia returned the favor 
often calling out Stevens, as well as Breyer and Kennedy.  
It’s the second finding that relates to membership change. Should 
 
 17.  Joseph L. Smith, Getting Personal in Supreme Court Opinions, 54 WASH. U. J. L. & 
POL’Y. 187 (2017). 
 18.  E.g., Cristian Farias, Supreme Court Justices Unanimous in Admiration for Antonin 
Scalia, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 15, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/antonin-
scalia-supreme-court-colleagues_us_56c0d07de4b0b40245c711da. 
 19.  Stephen Breyer quoted in Samantha Guzman, Stephen Breyer On How the Supreme 
Court Justices Get Along, (Dec. 13, 2016), http://keranews.org/post/stephen-breyer-how-
supreme-court-justices-get-along. 
 20.  As Elena Kagan put it “There are nine of us, and we do this thing that only the nine of 
us do, which you can’t really talk to anybody else about . . . . There’s a kind of bonding that 
occurs because of that.” Quoted in Pat Vaughan Tremmel, Kagan Talks About Life on the 
Supreme Court (Jan. 5, 2015), https://news.northwestern.edu/stories/2015/02/kagan-talks-
about-life-on-the-supreme-court/. 
 21.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579 (2008). 
 22.  Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 557 (2010). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/7
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Gorsuch decline to play the naming game in an effort to restore 
tradition or, more likely, to curry favor with the Court’s key player, 
Kennedy, noticeable effects on the law could follow.   
II. A DISTINCTIVE COURT? 
Whether there’s a Roberts Court or Courts, the question of the 
era’s distinctiveness remains relevant. Scholars emphasizing the 
importance of ideology, partisanship, or both might conclude that the 
answer is no. To them, the 2005 to 2016 terms are little more than a 
continuation of the Republican Court era, ushered in by the Nixon 
appointees and maintained by the Reagan and the Bush (I & II) 
justices. Put more starkly, on this account the Burger, Rehnquist, and 
Roberts Courts are fungible. 
Based on Figure 2, which shows the fraction of liberal decisions 
by chief justice era, this claim isn’t so easily dismissed.23 The Warren 
Court justices reached liberal decisions in about two out of every 
three cases (67.1% liberal). Beginning with the Burger Court, when 
the Court switched from a majority Democratic appointees to a 
majority Republican, and continuing through today, most decisions 
are conservative.24 
Figure 2. Fraction liberal decisions by Chief Justice era, 1953-
2015 terms25 
 
 23.  For the definition of a liberal decision, see the documentation to the U.S. Supreme 
Court Database at: http://scdb.wustl.edu/documentation.php?var=decisionDirection 
 24.  46.4% for the Burger Court, 46.7% for the Rehnquist Court, and 48% during the 
Roberts Court. 
 25.  Calculated from the Supreme Court Database (at http://supremecourtdatabase.org), 
Case Centered Data with Cases Organized by Citation, and decision Type=1 or 7. Only 
decisions coded liberal or conservative are included. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Still Figure 2 hardly supplies a complete answer to the question of 
the Roberts Court’s distinctiveness. For one thing, it ignores 
ideological trends within Chief Justices eras. For the Roberts Court 
this is a crucial omission because the Court has been drifting left ever 
since the 2010 term—so much so that the New York Times got it 
equally right when it reported that the Court’s 2009 term was the 
“Most Conservative in Decades”26 as when it proclaimed, “The 
Right-Wing Supreme Court…Wasn’t”27 in 2016. 
Second, because Figure 2 aggregates the data, it doesn’t tell us 
much about the effect of ideology at the individual level. Happily, 
Jeffrey A. Segal’s essay does, with his data exposing a stronger link 
between the Justices’ ideology and their voting ever since the Warren 
Court. (In statistical terms, the correlation increased from about 0.70 
range in the 1960s to today’s outsized 0.94.) Turncoat justices like 
Souter and Blackmun are no more—and may never be again as 
presidents work harder and harder to suss them out through rigorous 
 
 26.  Adam Liptak, Court Under Roberts is the Most Conservative in Decades, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 24, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/us/25roberts.html. 
 27.  Adam Liptak, The Right-Wing Supreme Court That Wasn’t, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/29/us/politics/supreme-court-term.html. 
.3
.4
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vetting.28 
The final and perhaps most obvious reason why Figure 2 and even 
Segal’s interesting study, don’t give us a full picture of 
distinctiveness is that distinctiveness isn’t only about ideology or 
partisanship. Truth be told, commentators have emphasized many 
other defining traits of the Roberts Court, with our authors weighing 
in on five: 29 a Court (a) losing public support, (b) reaching 
consensus, (c) having a hot bench (d) enamored with skilled 
attorneys, and (e) friendly toward business. It turns out that some are 
the stuff of legend, while others have some basis in fact. 
 
A. Losing Public Support? Yes and No but Mostly No 
Googling “Americans’ confidence in the Supreme Court” 
retrieves scores and scores of relevant and recent pages—many of 
which emphasize a decline in confidence,30 approval,31 and even 
prestige 32 It seems as if the Roberts Court is uniquely unpopular. 
Alison Higgins Merrill et al.’s article could be read to provide 
evidence for this claim.33 The various polls the authors consulted 
 
 28.  On Trump’s selection of Gorsuch, see Adam Liptak, How Trump Chose His Supreme 
Court Nominee, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-trump-supreme-court-
nominee.html. 
 29.  There are others, notably the “Harvard-Yalification” of the Roberts Court, see, for 
example, Larry Abrahamson, The Harvard-Yalification of the Supreme Court, NPR (May 16, 
2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126802460; and, the 
characterization of the Court as the Kennedy, not Roberts, Court. See, e.g., David Cole, This 
Isn’t the Roberts Court—It’s the Kennedy Court, NATION (Sept. 24, 2015), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/this-isnt-the-roberts-court-its-the-kennedy-court/.  
 30.  John Daniel Davidson, Americans Are Losing Confidence in the Supreme Court, 
FEDERALIST (June 29, 2016), http://thefederalist.com/2016/06/29/americans-are-losing-
confidence-in-the-supreme-court/. 
 31. Adam Liptak & Allison Kopick, Approval Rating for Justices Hits Just 44%, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/08/us/politics/44-percent-of-
americans-approve-of-supreme-court-in-new-poll.html. 
 32. Eric Posner, The Supreme Court’s Loss of Prestige, SLATE (Oct. 7, 2015), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2015/10/the_supreme_co
urt_is_losing_public_approval_and_prestige.html. 
 33.  Alison Higgins Merrill et al., Confidence and Constraint: Public Opinion, Judicial 
Independence, and the Roberts Court, 54 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 203 (2017). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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show that the Court’s standing with the public has never been lower; 
and this decline has affected the Justices’ willingness to monitor 
Congress. There’s a big but, though: approval for Congress and the 
executive branch is even lower. The suggestion here is that 
Americans’ support for all institutions of government, not just the 
Court, has declined steeply over time. 
James L. Gibson’s essay presents an even bigger challenge to the 
unpopular-Court narrative.34 Using a tried-and-true battery of 
questions designed to tap Americans’ assessment of the Court’s 
legitimacy, he shows that all the speculation about the Roberts 
Court’s loss of support is flat-out wrong: Americans remain loyal to 
their Supreme Court, despite disapproving some of its decisions. 
What’s more, because the Court continues to draw solid support from 
Democrats and Republicans alike, it may be the least polarized 
branch of government.   
Why? In an essay adapted from their imaginative book, U.S. 
Supreme Court Opinions and Their Audiences,35 Ryan C. Black et 
al. suggest one answer: the justices understand the importance of 
institutional legitimacy, and work hard to maintain it.36 That could 
mean avoiding the avant-garde, with the 2013 same-sex marriage 
case providing an example.37 Or it could involve factoring public 
opinion into case law (as doctrine governing obscenity and cruel and 
unusual punishment seems to do),38 or even reaching consensus to 
 
 34.  James L. Gibson, Performance Evaluations Are Not Legitimacy Judgments: A 
Caution About Interpreting Public Opinions Toward the United States Supreme Court, 54 
WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 69 (2017). 
 35.  RYAN C. BLACK ET AL., U.S. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS AND THEIR AUDIENCES 
(2016). 
 36.  Ryan C. Black et al., Supreme Court Opinions and Audiences, 54 WASH. U. J. L. & 
POL’Y 162 (2017). 
 37.  Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S.Ct. 2652 (2013). For commentary on the Court’s 
“sidestep” see Eyder Perlata, Court Overturns DOMA, Sidesteps Broad Gay Marriage Ruling, 
NPR (June 26, 2013), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2013/06/26/195857796/supreme-court-strikes-down-defense-of-marriage-act; Joan 
Biskupic, Analysis: Supreme Court Seems Poised to Avoid Same-Sex Marriage Tide, REUTERS 
(March 26, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-gaymarriage-justices-
idUSBRE92P17B20130326. 
 38.  For an analysis of these areas and the general strategy of building public opinion into 
case law, see LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, EFFICACIOUS JUDGING ON APEX COURTS 
in COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW (Rosalind Dixon & Erin F. Delaney eds.). Edward Elgar, in 
press (on file with the authors). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/7
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induce public support (more on this below). Black et al. set their 
sights on a different strategy: opinion composition. The central idea 
is that the justices write more (or less) clear opinions to boost support 
for the decisions. When they diverge from public opinion, for 
example, they tend to write with greater clarity so that the public will 
understand why they reached the decision they did. Earl Warren had 
it right after all.39 
B. Reaching Consensus? Yes and No but Mostly No 
Black et al. make a convincing argument about how the Court 
writes opinions to maintain public support and loyalty. But there are 
other approaches, as I suggest above, and the Roberts Court has 
supposedly followed one: laboring to produce unanimous decisions.40 
You’ve no doubt read about this consensus project, widely 
believed to be developed by the Chief himself.41 Maybe Roberts is 
just an agreeable sort (see Hall’s essay). Or perhaps he intuitively (or 
empirically) understands the punchline of Michael A. Zilis’s essay: 
Consensus leads to more favorable media coverage, which in turn 
increases popular support for the Court's decisions.42 This makes 
sense. Without dissents, journalists writing for the public lack 
material to punch holes in the majority’s arguments. (Of course the 
same doesn’t hold law blogsters; critiquing even unanimous decisions 
are their raison d'être.) 
 
 39.  See supra note 4. 
 40.  See, e.g., Daniel Fisher, So Much for Politics: More than Half of Supreme Court 
Decisions Unanimous, FORBES (June 1, 2012), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2012/06/01/so-much-for-politics-more-than-half-of-
supreme-court-decisions-unanimous/#31e811e24fff; Neal K. Katyal, The Supreme Court’s 
Powerful New Consensus, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/27/opinion/the-supreme-courts-powerful-new-
consensus.html. 
 41.  If not, see Katyal, supra note 41. Roberts said as much at a judicial conference (“I try 
to achieve as much consensus as I can”), quoted in Adam Liptak, Rulings and Remarks Tell 
Divided Story of an 8-Member Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/31/us/politics/rulings-and-remarks-tell-divided-story-of-an-
8-member-supreme-court.html. 
 42.  Michael A. Zilis, The Political Consequences of Supreme Court Consensus: Medica 
Coverage, Public Opinion, and Unanimity as a Public-Facing Strategy, 54 WASH. U. J. L. & 
POL’Y 221 (2017). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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 But is it true that the Roberts Court has accomplished the 
“remarkable” feat of issuing more decisions without dissent than in 
previous eras, as some commentators maintain?43 Across the four 
chief justices periods in Figure 3, the Court was unanimous (no 
dissents) in 37% of the 6,332 orally argued decisions resulting in a 
signed majority opinion or judgment. On the one hand, the Roberts 
Court’s rate of 42% is significantly higher than that, lending support 
to the commentary. On the other hand, statistically speaking the 
Roberts justices are no more or less likely than the Rehnquist justices 
to decide cases unanimously. The lack of a significant difference 
between the two eras is more suggestive a trend toward greater 
consensus than a signal achievement of the Roberts Court. (And keep 
in mind that the data in Figure 3 don’t account for faux unanimity,44 
which some say is a distinctive trait of the current Court). 
 
Figure 3. Fraction decisions without dissent by Chief Justice era, 
1953-2015 terms45
 
 43. Katyal, supra note 41; Zilis, supra note 42. 
 44.  Usually meaning 9-0 decisions with one or more concurring opinions (some of which 
read closer to dissents than concurrences. See Adam Liptak, Justices Long on Words but Short 
on Guidance, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/us/18rulings.html; Robert Barnes, For These Supreme 
Court Justices, Unanimous Doesn’t Mean Unity, WASH. POST (July 1, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/for-these-supreme-court-justices-
unanimous-doesnt-mean-unity/2014/07/01/94003590-0132-11e4-b8ff-
89afd3fad6bd_story.html?utm_term=.23ca6ffe2817. 
 45.  Calculated from the Supreme Court Database (at: http://supremecourtdatabase.org) 
with decisionType=1 or 7 and minVotes=0. 
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The Roberts Court doesn’t do all that much better on other 
measures of unity.46 Recall Smith’s finding of a breakdown in the 
long-standing norm against naming and blaming in opinions—
perhaps a cause (or consequence) of fraying relations on the current 
Court.47 Then there’s Timothy R. Johnson and Ryan C. Black’s essay 
on oral arguments, unmasking several “serial interrupters”48 on the 
Roberts Court. The generally agreeable Justice Kennedy is one 
(though his colleagues rarely interrupt him. Surprise surprise.). But 
Sotomayor is not; she is the least likely to interrupt another justice. 
Now that is a surprise considering commentary on her less-than-
deferential demeanor on the bench. When she served as an appellate 
judge, lawyers described her as a “bully,” a “terror,” and just plain 
 
 46.  Including other approaches to measuring consensus. See supra note 45. 
 47.  Smith, supra note 17. 
 48.  Timothy R. Johnson & Ryan C. Black, The Roberts Court and Oral Arguments: A 
First Decade Retrospective, 54 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 131 (2017). 
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“nasty.”49 Either she’s changed or she’s just more courteous to her 
colleagues than to lawyers. 
C. A Hot Bench? Mostly Yes  
Speaking of oral arguments, it’s way too late in the day to take 
issue with the conventional depiction of the Roberts Court as having 
a hot bench;50 mounds of data support it.51 
Nonetheless, Johnson & Black’s essay adds quite a bit of 
nuance.52 For example, the authors demonstrate that even though 
(most of) today’s justices aren’t wallflowers, they still give attorneys 
considerable leeway. Of the total words spoken at oral arguments the 
share is 39% for the justices and 61% for the attorneys. This is even 
more remarkable because each new Roberts Justice has tended to be 
chattier than his or her predecessor.53  Sotomayor is an exception (on 
average she speaks fewer words than did Souter); and Gorsuch may 
prove to be one as well as Justice Scalia long vied with Breyer for the 
#1 ranking on most indexes of talkativeness.54 
 
D. Enamored with Expert Attorneys? Mostly Yes 
Perhaps even the very active questioners on the Roberts Court 
give attorneys their due because the attorneys are very good. As 
Lazarus55 and Biskupic et al.56 revealed several years back, advocates 
 
 49.  Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Sotomayor, a Trailblazer and a Dreamer, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/27/us/politics/27websotomayor.html. 
 50.  E.g., Adam Liptak, A Most Inquisitive Court? No Argument There, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
7, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/08/us/inquisitive-justices-no-argument-there.html. 
 51.  See, e.g., Timothy R. Johnson et al., Inquiring Minds Want to Know: Do Justices Tip 
Their Hands with Questions at Oral Argument in the U.S. Supreme Court?, 29 WASH. UNIV. 
J.L. & POL’Y 241 (2009); Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 13, at 311–15. 
 52.  Johnson & Black, supra note 48. 
 53.  Johnson & Black, supra note 48, Figure 1.  
 54.  Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 13, at 330; Robert Barnes, Supreme Court 
Justices are Talking More, WASH. POST (March 2, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2011/03/01/AR2011030104697.html. 
 55.  Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court, 96 GEO. 
L.J. 1487 (2008) (table 3). 
 56. Joan Biskupic et al., The Echo Chamber, REUTERS (Dec. 8, 2014), 
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appearing for the first time in the Supreme Court are now in the 
minority; a small of group of experts dominates. At the same time, 
“friend-of-the-court” participation can’t go much higher; almost 
every case during the Roberts years attracted at least one amicus 
curiae brief.57  
Our contributors do not bother to rehearse these facts; they rather 
analyze their importance. Take Adam Feldman’s essay on the success 
of these expert attorneys.58 Among other findings, Feldman shows 
that former Roberts Court clerks—a healthy fraction of today’s (and 
tomorrow’s) “elite” litigators59—can leverage knowledge of their 
former bosses’ preferences into success for their clients. Along 
similar lines, Morgan L. W. Hazelton and her colleagues demonstrate 
that the effect of amicus curiae briefs depends less on lopsided filings 
for one side or other (as some studies suggest60) than on the quality of 
the information they provide the justices.61 
Shane A. Gleason et al.’s62 and Christine Nemacheck’s63 articles 
also explore advocacy but their focus is on less traditional forms. The 
Gleason team tests a novel hypothesis about female attorneys: 
Because they represent only 12% of all litigators before the Court, 
they should be more successful when they conform their advocacy to 
gender expectations (emotional and warm) rather than professional 
norms (unemotional and assertive). The data support the 
hypothesis—for now. Stay tuned as more and more women appear 
 
http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/scotus/. 
 57.  Lazarus, supra note 56, at 1514 (tbl. 1).   
 58.  Adam Feldman, Former Roberts Court Clerks’ Success Litigating Before the 
Supreme Court, 54 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 55 (2017). 
 59.  John Shiffman, Former Clerks: Today’s Prospects, Tomorrow’s Elite, REUTERS, 
http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/scotus/#sidebar-clerks. 
 60.  E.g., Paul M. Collins, Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus 
Curiae Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 L. & SOC. REV. 807 (2004); Paul M. 
Collins, Lobbyists before the U.S. Supreme Court: Investigating the Influence of Amicus Curiae 
Briefs, 60 POL. RESEARCH Q. 55 (2007). 
 61.  Morgan L. W. Hazelton, The Long and Short of It: The Influence of Briefs on 
Outcomes in the Roberts Court, 54 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 119 (2017). 
 62.  Shane A. Gleason et al., Gender Performance in Party Brief Success, 54 WASH. U. J. 
L. & POL’Y 89 (2017). 
 63.  Christine L. Nemacheck, The Path to Obergefell: Saying “I do” to New Judicial 
Federalism?, 54 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 143 (2017). 
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before the Court.   
Nemacheck too takes a different cut at advocacy, focusing less on 
attorneys than on the groups and movements behind the Roberts 
Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges64  to invalidate same-sex 
marriage bans. As she explains, years before anyone had ever 
imagined a “Roberts Court,” Justice William Brennan laid the 
groundwork for the expansion of rights with his “new judicial 
federalism.”65 By adapting Brennan’s approach to their cause, gay 
rights advocates achieved the state victories that served as the 
“stepping-stones” to Obergefell, demonstrating, yet again, that Justice 
Scalia was right to call Brennan “probably the most influential 
justice” of the 20th century.66 Maybe the 21st too.  
E. A Business-Friendly Court? Yes but with Some Surprises 
But even Brennan’s influence has its limits, and business 
cases are one. Five years ago, William M. Landes. and Richard 
A. Posner and I found that the Roberts Court was the most pro-
business of the five Chief Justice eras in our dataset (from 
Vinson through Roberts).67 Updating our study through the 
2015 term does no damage to that conclusion68 but our new 
findings are nonetheless surprising: Although the conservatives 
(all Republican appointees) on the Roberts Court are more 
favorable to business than the four liberals (all Democratic 
appointees), the liberals are hardly anti-business. We show that 
the four are far more business-friendly than Democratic 
appointees of any other Court era. Even more unexpected, the 
Roberts Democrats vote in favor of business at significantly 
 
 64.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 65. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutionalism and the Protection of Individual 
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (2007). 
 66. Quoted in Justice Brennan Remembered, PBS NEWS HOUR (July 24, 1997), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law-july-dec97-brennan_7-24a/ (transcript). 
 67.  Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the 
Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431 (2013). 
 68. Lee Epstein et al., When It Comes to Business, the Right and the Left Sides of the 
Court Agree, 54 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 32 (2017). 
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higher rates than Republican appointees in all the other chief 
justice periods since 1946.  
****** 
And there you have it: a symposium that tries to capture the 
moving target that is the Roberts Court. Perhaps we authors will 
return in a few years to assess the accuracy of our characterizations 
and predictions. In the meantime, please let us know how you think 
we’ve done. I know I speak for all the authors when I say that we’d 
love our work products to stimulate debate and conversations about 
the Court—today and as it continues to evolve. 
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